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Abstract
The Bare Theory was offered by David Albert as a way of standing by
the completeness of quantum mechanics in the face of the measurement
problem. This paper surveys objections to the Bare Theory that recur in
the literature: what will here be called the oddity objection, the coherence objection, and the context-of-the-universe objection. Critics usually
take the Bare Theory to have unacceptably bizarre consequences, but to
be free from internal contradiction. Bizarre consequences need not be
decisive against the Bare Theory, but a further objection—dubbed here
the calibration objection—has been underestimated. This paper argues
that the Bare Theory is not only odd but also inconsistent. We can imagine a successor to the Bare Theory—the Stripped Theory—which avoids
the objections and fulfills the original promise of the Bare Theory, but
at the cost of amplifying the bizarre consequences. The Stripped Theory
is either a stunning development in our understanding of the world or a
reductio disproving the completeness of quantum mechanics.
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The Bare Theory

We can exemplify the quantum mechanical measurement problem in the usual
way by considering a particle like an electron. Note that an electron has two
1

possible spin states in the x direction: up and down. Call the quantum state
where the electron is spin up |xup i; where it is spin down, |xdown i. Suppose now
that you observe the particle. The relevant features of you involved in observing
the electron may be represented crudely as having three possible states: in one
you are prepared to make the observation, in another you have observed that
the electron is spin up, and in the last you have observed that the electron is
spin down. Call the quantum states corresponding to each of the three states
|Ulooking i, |Uup i, and |Udown i respectively. Suppose further that you are a meticulous observer. If the particle is in state |xup i and you are in state |Ulooking i,
then you will go into state |Uup i without fail. If the particle is |xdown i, then
you will go into |Udown i. We may write these conditions as
|Ulooking i|xup i
|Ulooking i|xdown i

→
→

|Uup i|xup i
|Udown i|xdown i

(1)

Now suppose that the electron is neither in the pure state |xup i nor in the pure
state |xdown i, but rather in the arbitrary superposition (α|xup i + β|xdown i) for
some non-zero values of α and β. From (1), and the fact that the mechanics is
linear, we can conclude
|Ulooking i(α|xup i + β|xdown i) → α|Uup i|xup i + β|Udown i|xdown i

(2)

That is, if you look at the electron when it is in a superposition, you will go into
a superposition of the pure state associated with your saying that the electron is
spin up and the pure state associated with your saying that the electron is spin
down. On the usual interpretation (the eigenvalue-eigenstate link) this means
that your observation doesn’t take on a determinate value at all. Instead, you
are in a superposition of saying that it is spin up and saying that it is spin
down. This is very puzzling, because it would not seem to you as if you were in
a superposition. As a meticulous observer, you would surely make a determinate
observation. This paradox captures the crux of the measurement problem.
David Albert ([1992], pp. 116–25) suggests that we consider what would
happen if you were asked whether you had made a determinate observation.
You wonder to yourself whether you did in fact make a determinate observation. The relevant features of you involved in this act of introspection may be
represented crudely as having three possible states: in one you are pondering
the matter, in another you have concluded that you did make a determinate
observation, and in the last you have concluded that you did not. Call the
quantum states corresponding to each of the three states |Vwondering i, |Vyes i,
and |Vno i respectively. Suppose that you are as keen an observer of yourself as
you are of electrons. Thus, if the electron is in a pure state you will observe that
it is and you will conclude that, yes, you did make a determinate observation.
To put this formally:
|Vwondering i|Uup i|xup i
|Vwondering i|Udown i|xdown i
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→
→

|Vyes i|Uup i|xup i
|Vyes i|Udown i|xdown i

(3)

It follows from (2) and (3) that
|Vwondering i|Ulooking i(α|xup i + β|xdown i) →
α|Vyes i|Uup i|xup i + β|Vyes i|Udown i|xdown i

(4)

We may rewrite the resulting state in (4) as
|Vyes i(α|Uup i|xup i + β|Udown i|xdown i)

(5)

This contains only a |Vyes i term. On the usual interpretation, then, you would
be in a determinate state of concluding that you had made a determinate observation. However, you would not be in a determinate state of observing the
electron to be spin up or of observing the electron to be spin down!1
This allows for an odd solution to the measurement problem, one Albert dubs
the Bare Theory. According to the Bare Theory, the quantum mechanical wave
function is a complete and accurate description of the world, the eigenstateeigenvalue link holds, and wave functions never collapse. As a result, you do
not make a determinate observation after you look at an electron that is in a
superposition—you will be in a superposition of |Uup i and |Udown i. Yet you will
believe that you are in such a determinate state—you will be in the eigenstate
|Vyes i. The paradox is resolved by explaining how it can appear to you that you
are in a determinate state while you are, in fact, not in one.

2

The Usual Objections

Three objections to the Bare Theory recur in the literature. One is that the
Bare Theory is so odd that we should not accept it. Worse than odd, in fact,
because the world described by the Bare Theory is manifestly not the world we
inhabit. Call this the oddity objection. Another objection is that if the Bare
Theory were true, then we could not know it to be true. The very evidence we
call upon in defense of quantum theory is denied by the Bare Theory. Call this
the coherence objection. A third objection is that the Bare Theory supposes
that the universe is in a determinate state of you being prepared to make an
observation. If it were not so—and we have no reason to expect that it would
be so—then the Bare Theory cannot explain even your belief that you made a
determinate observation. Call this the context-of-the-universe objection.
First, the oddity objection. Consider the case of the electron in a superposition and your observation of it. The Bare Theory offers no explanation for why
you observe it to be spin up or to be spin down. This seems like a deficiency in
the theory, but only if you suppose that you do indeed observe it to be one or
the other. This is just what is denied on the Bare Theory. It purports to explain
how you can believe that you have a determinate belief, when in fact you have
no such thing. Michael Dickson ([1998], p. 47) insists that this is a telling point
against the Bare Theory, since it is obviously false in claiming that you would
not make a determinate answer if asked whether the electron were spin up or
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spin down. Bub, et al. ([1998], p. 42) also consider the oddity objection to be
telling.
There is something wrong about the oddity objection. Explanations ought
to account for as much as possible, to be sure, and should explain why certain
things are the case. They may also explain away some things, however, by
denying the fact in question and offering an explanation for the appearance.
The Bare Theory can be defended against the oddity objection by insisting
that the determinate answer about the state of the electron is to be explained
away, while the belief that there is a determinate answer is to be accepted and
explained. As Jeffrey Barrett observes, “we typically give our theories the chance
to explain why things are not as they seem” ([1999], p. 112). We acknowledge
this feature of explanation in non-philosophical cases. Suppose a child—terrified
of monsters—tells us about the vampire that is lurking outside her window. We
are under no obligation to explain why there is a vampire outside the window.
We would instead deny that there is a vampire and explain the child’s belief that
there is a vampire. We deny the alleged supernatural phenomena in explaining
the superstition.
This feature of explanation is also perspicuous in the philosophy of mind.
There are traditional views of mental life: that beliefs in our minds have a
propositional or pseudo-propositional structure, that our conscious lives are
transparent to us, that we have incorrigible access to how the world seems
to us, and so on. Some philosophers advocate rejecting the received views and
adopting a promising account that explains away the alleged features of mental
life. For instance, Daniel Dennett ([1991]) tries to explain away many features
of consciousness; Paul Churchland aims to explain away propositional structure
(passim; for a recent statement, see his [1998], §I). Regardless of how these explanations are ultimately judged, they should not be dismissed on account of
oddity alone. There is no formal boundary between what must be explained
and what may be explained away, so oddity need not carry logical force.
A second objection turns on the fact that whatever we take to be our evidence
for believing in quantum mechanics is denied on the Bare Theory. The data that
physicists collect are not determinate observations in abstract, but in each case
some particular result: The first observation may be spin up, the second spin
down, the third again spin down, and so on. If the Bare Theory is to be believed,
such data does not exist even though it is true that for each observation ‘The
physicist makes a determinate observation’ is true. The Bare Theory cannot
even recover the relative frequencies in the data, for instance that spin up was
observed 49% of the time in a run of trials. Albert ([1992], pp. 122–4) shows
that frequencies may be recovered if there are infinitely many observations, but
not in a way that generalizes to finite data sets even in the limit of very large
numbers of observations.
The objection is not that the Bare Theory is logically incoherent, but rather
that it is empirically incoherent. The term is due to Barrett ([1996]), but the
sentiment is expressed by most authors responding the Bare Theory.2 Dickson,
for instance, objects that the Bare Theory could only be held “on pure faith”
since its truth entails that we are mistaken about what we took to be evidence
4

for quantum mechanics. He presses the point further, suggesting that “it is not
even clear that the bare theory is susceptible to rational adherence” ([1998],
p. 47).
Like the first, this objection needn’t be decisive against the Bare Theory.
It is always possible to embrace a certain empirical incoherence without abandoning rationality entirely. Sometimes we come to believe something which we
reflectively endorse even though we recognize that we initially came to believe
it for bad reasons. Perhaps the Bare Theorist will reflectively endorse quantum
mechanics even absent the evidence which was critical for its historical acceptance. Perhaps, to use Wittgenstein’s metaphor, the evidence is a ladder which
must be kicked away once we have climbed to the dizzying height of quantum
theory. (The analogy with Wittgenstein is not quite precise. I return to this
point below.)
Dickson concludes his brief discussion by remarking, “Probably these consequences of the bare theory are sufficiently bizarre to render it unacceptable
to most readers” ([1998], p. 47). Probably they are, but perhaps they are not.
What of the reader who has a greater tolerance for the bizarre? In answer
to that reader, we would need an objection to the Bare Theory that is more
compelling than these.
A third objection, the context-of-the-universe objection, is less easily deflected. As Albert ([1992], pp. 124–5) notes, the universe is unlikely to be in
an eigenstate for your existence and hence the initial setup in which you are in
the eigenstate |Vwondering i is implausible . This means that there will be terms
in addition to the |Vyes i term, in some of which you do not exist at all. Since
the Bare Theory derives its explanatory force from the fact that you will wind
up in the eigenstate |Vyes i, the Bare Theory fails when considered in this wider
context. Barrett ([1999], pp. 119–20) considers this to be a decisive objection
to the Bare Theory.

3

The Calibration Objection

Having considered the usual objections, let’s return to the formulation of the
Bare Theory above. You are by assumption able to accurately observe whether
or not you have made a determinate observation of the electron’s spin. Consider
what this means: If you are a reliable judge on some matter, we will expect you
to assent when the matter obtains and dissent when it fails to obtain. The
former condition was expressed in (3); the latter condition may be represented
by
|Vwondering i(α|Uup i|xup i + β|Udown i|xdown i) →
|Vno i(α|Uup i|xup i + β|Udown i|xdown i)

(6)

for non-zero coefficients α and β. That is, if you are in some superposition of
|Uup i and |Udown i, you will answer ‘No’ if asked whether or not you have made
a determinate observation.

5

Considering a superposition for appropriate values of α and β,3 it follows
from (6) that
|Vwondering i|Uup i|xup i → |Vno i|Uup i|xup i
(7)
Hence, you would answer ‘No’ if you are in eigenstate |Uup i even though |Uup i
represents a determinate observation! For the Bare Theory even to have its
tenuous hold on explanatory force, your self examination must be of the sort
described in (3) rather than of the sort described in (6). However, there is no
obvious reason why accuracy in your own self reports is better formalized in
terms of your ‘Yes’ answers (and hence represented by (3)) rather than in terms
of your ‘No’ answers (and hence represented by (6)).
The situation for the Bare Theory is actually worse than that. Since both
conditions must hold for your ability to be reliable, it seems plausible to say that
if you can accurately answer whether or not your observation of the electron
had a determinate result then you should be treated as a system satisfying both
(3) and (6). Yet these taken together are inconsistent given quantum mechanics
and indeed given any linear dynamics.4 ‘This is a determinate state’ is not itself
a quantum-mechanical observable, so the assumption that you are accurately
able to judge whether your first observation yielded a determinate result is
incompatible with the assumption that you are only a quantum system. Call
this the calibration objection, since it presumes that reliable self reports must
be calibrated so as to satisfy both (3) and (6).
Barrett ([1998], p. 324) and Bub, et al. ([1998], pp. 38–9) insist that this
objection should not be decisive. The Bare Theory, as a general account, need
only explain how our experience is nomologically possible not that our experience
is necessary. The advocate of the Bare Theory might insist: The fact that
we think we have determinate experience shows that (3) alone is the correct
calibration condition for us as cognitive agents. We have reason to expect our
brains to accord with conditions like (3), but what we know about brains makes
it unlikely that they can make the interference measurements that would be
involved in a condition like (6).
Despite the plausibility of this reply, it will not do. If the semantics of a
state is constituted by its inferential force—and since the inferential force of ‘I
made a determinate observation’ is characterized by (3) and (6)—then the state
|Vyes i as represented in the Bare Theory cannot mean ‘I made a determinate
observation.’ One need not accept a fully inferentialist semantic theory in order
to see the force of this objection. One need only feel that the meaning of
certain claims is bound up in some important way with defeasibility conditions.
If it were not, why would the state corresponding to ‘I made a determinate
observation’ need to accord with either of (3) or (6)?
According to the Bare Theory, you are a quantum system and you believe
determinately that you made a determinate observation. Yet, by the argument
given above, these conditions entail both (3) and (6). Since these are inconsistent, the Bare Theory is logically incoherent. Not only is it unacceptable on
assumptions that most people would accept as reasonable, it is unacceptable on
its own terms. This is a stronger objection than the usual ones, because it would
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force the adherent of the Bare Theory to give up not only arguably important
beliefs but pieces of the Bare Theory itself.

4

Beyond the Bare Theory

Someone enamoured of the Bare Theory may still respond to this objection, but
only by making some change in the Bare Theory itself. We might represent the
Bare Theory as the conjunction of several claims: (B1) The quantum mechanical
wave function is a complete and accurate description of the world. (B2) The
eigenstate-eigenvalue link holds. (B3) Wave functions never collapse. (B4) Our
belief that we make determinate observations is to be explained by the fact that
the observable ‘We made a determinate observation’ typically returns a ‘Yes’
answer. Which of the four must be changed?
Barrett ([1998]) and Bub, et al. ([1998]) recommend revisions to the Bare
Theory that add hidden variables of some sort or another. This explicitly eschews B1, but also rejects B2 and B4 as an immediate consequence. Of the
elements that define the Bare Theory, only B3 would remain. The notion that
hidden variables could ‘fix the Bare Theory’ is rather odd. Would any nocollapse theory, any theory that satisfies B3, count as a variant of the Bare
Theory? Suppose instead that our Bare Theorist wants to keep more than that.
As we saw in the previous section, the assumption that you are able to accurately observe whether or not your initial observation ended in a determinate
result is incompatible with the assumption that your observations are quantum
records. That is, B4 is incompatible with the rest. Suppose the Bare Theorist
gives up B4 and says that you are not able to accurately observe whether or not
your initial observation ended in a determinate result. There is nothing special
about this self report among others, though, so he must further deny that you
are ever able to accurately judge whether a record is in a determinate state.
If beliefs are instantiated in quantum systems—and they must be if quantum
mechanics is complete—then you will not be able to judge whether or not any
observable has a determinate value. You may imagine you make such judgments, the Bare Theorist may insist, but you are in fact misdescribing whatever
judgments you actually do make. This successor to the Bare Theory, which we
might call the Stripped Theory, explains away your determinate beliefs not only
at the level of direct observation but also at every level of reflection. We may
represent the Stripped Theory as the conjunction of B1–B3 and: (S4) For all
observables O, it is nomologically impossible to have a belief with the content
‘O has a determinate value.’
The measurement problem alleges that quantum mechanics could not be
complete, since you never find yourself in a superposition. The Bare Theorist
aimed to solve the measurement problem by showing that, since quantum mechanics is complete, you would judge yourself to be in a determinate state even
if you were in a superposition. Thus, your insistence that you are never in
a superposition is consistent with you actually being in a superposition. The
Bare Theory fails because, if quantum mechanics is complete, you could not
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make a judgment that would count as a judgment that you are in a determinate
state. (This is the calibration objection.) So the Stripped Theorist responds to
the measurement problem by insisting that, since quantum mechanics is complete, you could never judge yourself contentfully to be in a determinate or
indeterminate state. Thus, your insistence that you are never in a superposition is vacuous. The Stripped Theory is a natural synthesis in this dialectic,
constructed so as to avoid the calibration objection; how does it fair against the
other three objections?
One may worry that the Stripped Theory is infinitely more vulnerable to
the oddity objection. In considering the oddity objection, however, we saw that
explaining away phenomena is sometimes a permissible way of accounting for
them. There is no formal restraint on this permissibility, so the objection lacks
absolute compulsion here just as it did for the Bare Theory. The same holds for
the coherence objection. The reader may find the Stripped Theory too odd or
outré, but it’s unclear what probative force that should have.
Yet one might press the point: The measurement problem arises because
there is a contradiction between the usual interpretation of quantum mechanics
(according to which we are superpositions) and our ordinary experience (according to which we are always in determinate states). Merely denying the latter
isn’t an answer to the measurement problem so much as a refusal to take the
problem seriously. We could just as easily deny the former, if our only aim is
merely to avoid contradiction. Yet the Stripped Theorist might echo Wittgenstein, who suggests that literal language is only the language of science, that
philosophy should “say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions
of natural science” ([1922], §6.53). The only way to answer someone who wants
to say more, Wittgenstein thinks, is to point out that anything more would be
meaningless. The Bare and Stripped Theories presume that quantum mechanics is the language of science. The Stripped Theorist’s insistence that noone
can meaningfully claim to have a determinate belief should be seen as the natural consequence of that presumption, rather than as an ad hoc answer to the
measurement problem.
Wittgenstein recognized that his account was, by his own standards, meaningless. He explains, “My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who
understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out
through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it)” ([1922], §6.54). Whereas with the Bare
Theory physical evidence leads us to an account which describes that evidence
as meaningful but literally false, for Wittgenstein the Tractatus leads us to an
account which describes the Tractatus as nonsense. Similarly, with the Stripped
Theory physical evidence leads us to an account that describes that evidence as
nonsense. The Stripped Theory must be nonsense, too, since there is no way
that a quantum system can record the fact that determinateness is not a quantum observable. The Stripped Theory, then, is not a theory after all. It merely
points to a resolution of the measurement problem. This is odd, certainly, but
is it odd enough to be a decisive objection?
To its credit, the Stripped Theory deflects the context-of-the-universe objec8

tion. The universe may be in a superposition of your existing and not existing,
but how can you say this is not the case? You could only show otherwise if you
could tell whether your existence were determinate, but the Stripped Theory
holds that we are unable to judge whether the observable ‘You exist’ has a determinate value. Such a judgment, if it were to accurately capture both positive
and negative cases, could never be instantiated in a quantum mechanical record.
Our own brains are quantum mechanical records, so your insistence that you
exist is to be explained away rather than explained.
To tally the score: The Bare Theory and the Stripped Theory are both
vulnerable to the oddity and coherence objections. The context-of-the-universe
and calibration objections, which are decisive against the Bare Theory, have no
hold on the Stripped Theory. The latter is a worse affront to our intuitions
than even the former, but there is a difference between reduction to affront and
reductio ad absurdum. It is hard to see how the Stripped Theory could face
a logical contradiction when considered on its own terms. In this, it has an
advantage over the Bare Theory. It is for us to decide if we have reached a
secure enough place that we are prepared to kick away the ladder of evidence
from underneath us.
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Notes
1

Provided you take my disjunction in the classical and not the quantum
logical sense. Similar provisos may be added to logical connectives throughout
the paper.
2

The objection is made in a cursory fashion in Albert ([1992], p. 124) and
9

Dickson ([1998], p. 47). It is developed with the most care and at the greatest
length by Barrett ([1996], [1999], pp. 116–7). A theory is empirically incoherent, Barrett stipulates, if it “fails to predict the existence of reliable records of
an observer’s measurement results to which the observer has epistemic access”
([1996], p. 50).
√
3
Let A be vector produced
by assigning √
1/ 2 to α and β; let B be vector
√
produced by assigning 1/ 2 to α and −1/ 2 to β. It follows from (6) and
the linearity of the dynamics that (|Vwondering iA + |Vwondering iB) → (|Vno iA +
|Vno iB). This may be simplified and renormalized so as to yield (7).
4

They entail (5) and (7), yet you cannot simultaneously be in the state |Vyes i
and |Vno i. GRW avoids this problem, since it posits non-linear evolution of the
wave function; there is a sense in which GRW says that quantum mechanics
complete (it presumes that the wave function is a complete and accurate description of the world) and a sense in which it does not (it replaces the usual
linear dynamics and must deny a strict eigenstate-eigenvalue link).
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